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In recent years there has been a growing interest in macro models with heterogeneity in information
and complementarity in actions. These models deliver promising positive properties, such as heightened
inertia and volatility. But they also raise important normative questions, such as whether the heightened
inertia and volatility are socially undesirable, whether there is room for policies that correct the way
agents use information in equilibrium, and what are the welfare effects of the information disseminated
by the media or policy makers. We argue that a key to answering all these questions is the relation
between the equilibrium and the socially optimal degrees of coordination. The former summarizes
the private value from aligning individual decisions, whereas the latter summarizes the value that society
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In recent years, there has been a growing interest in models that share the following
two key features: (i) heterogeneity in information about the underlying economic fun-
damentals; and (ii) complementarity in actions. Examples include the beauty-contest
game in Morris and Shin (2002); the investment games in Angeletos and Pavan (2004)
and Angeletos, Lorenzoni and Pavan (2006); the common-interest game in the paper
by Morris and Shin in this issue; and the business-cycle models in Woodford (2002),
Hellwig (2005), Lorenzoni (2005), and Roca (2005).1
These models deliver interesting positive properties, such as inertia (i.e., slow re-
sponse to changes in the underlying fundamentals) and heightened non-fundamental
volatility (i.e., high sensitivity to common noise in information about the underlying
fundamentals). But they also raise important normative questions.
1. Is the heightened inertia or volatility due to complementarity socially undesirable?
2. Are there policies that could manipulate the way agents use information, and
thereby correct the sensitivity of the equilibrium to both fundamentals and noise?
If yes, how do these policies look like?
3. How does the incompleteness of information aﬀect welfare? What is the social
value of the information disseminated by prices, market experts, or the media?
Should central banks disclose the information they collect and the forecasts they
make about the economy in a transparent and timely fashion, or is there room for
“constructive ambiguity”?
To answer these questions, one needs: (1) to compare the equilibrium use of in-
formation with an appropriate constrained eﬃciency benchmark, namely the use of
available information that maximizes welfare; (2) to identify policies that implement
the eﬃcient use of information as an equilibrium; and (3) to understand the compara-
tive statics of equilibrium welfare with respect to the information structure.
Ongoing work (Angeletos and Pavan, 2006a,b) undertakes these tasks in a broad
class of economies with heterogeneous information, externalities, and strategic comple-
mentarity or substitutability in actions, and discusses a variety of applications. In this
1This class of models diﬀers from global games in that the coordination element is moderate enough
that the equilibrium is unique no matter the precision of private and public information. Related are
also models with “inattentive” agents, as in Mankiw and Reis (2006).
2paper, we restrict attention to a (sub)class in which ineﬃciency emerges only when
information is incomplete, thus isolating the ineﬃciencies that originate in the use of
information from other possible distortions.2
This facilitates the main message of this paper: the key to answering all the ques-
tions above is the relation between the equilibrium and the socially optimal degrees of
coordination. The former is identiﬁed with the slope of an agent’s best response with
respect to others’ activity, and pins down the equilibrium use of information; the latter
is identiﬁed with the slope that would make agents internalize all externalities, and
pins down the eﬃcient use of information. The former summarizes the private value
from aligning individual decisions; the latter summarizes the value that society assigns
to such an alignment.
2 A simple model
There is a continuum of agents, indexed by i and uniformly distributed over [0,1], each
choosing an action ki ∈ R (e.g., think of k as investment). There is also a government,
which makes transfers ti to the agents, subject to budget balance,
R
tidi = 0.
Payoﬀs. Agent i’s payoﬀ is ui + ti, where
ui = −(ki − θ)2 − r
￿
Li − ¯ L
￿
− r∗¯ L.
θ ∈ R is an exogenous random fundamental (e.g., aggregate productivity), Li =
R
(kj − ki)
2 dj is the mean-square distance of i’s action from other agents’ actions,
¯ L =
R
Lidi is the average of these distances, and r and r∗ are non-negative scalars.
This payoﬀ structure has a simple interpretation. The term (ki − θ)
2 captures the
value of taking an action that is aligned with the fundamentals, whereas the term Li
introduces a private value to aligning one’s action to those of others—the source of
strategic complementarity. The term ¯ L, on the other hand, introduces an externality
which controls the discrepancy, if any, between the private and the social value of such
alignment.
2Actually, the results presented here extend to economies where the distance between the complete-
information equilibrium and the ﬁrst-best is non-zero, as long as this distance is invariant with θ (see
Angeletos and Pavan, 2006a,b.) Thus, one can think of the class considered here as capturing business-
cycle models in which, under complete information, the “output gap” is non-zero but constant over
the business cycle.
3Indeed, since ¯ L does not depend on agent i’s action, from a strategic viewpoint it
is as if payoﬀs were u
private






−(ki − θ)2 − r∗Li
￿
di.
Hence, from a social perspective it is as if payoﬀs were given by usocial
i = −(ki −
θ)2 − r∗Li. In this sense, r parametrizes the private value of aligning choices, while r∗
parametrizes the social value of such alignment.
Remark. While the particular payoﬀs assumed here admit a convenient inter-
pretation, the key assumption is only that ineﬃciency vanishes once information is
complete (Angeletos and Pavan, 2006a,b). Here, the complete-information equilibrium
and the ﬁrst-best allocation are both given by ki = θ,∀i. 3
Information. For the purposes of this paper it is important to allow agents
to have heterogeneous information about θ; for concreteness, we adopt a Gaussian
speciﬁcation. Before agents move, nature draws θ from a Normal distribution with
mean µ and variance σ2
θ. The realization of θ is not observed by the agents. Instead,
agents observe private signals xi = θ +ξi and a public signal y = θ +ε, where ξi and ε
are, respectively, idiosyncratic and common Normal noises, independent of one another
as well as of θ, with variances σ2
x and σ2
y.
3 Equilibrium degree of coordination
We start by characterizing equilibrium without government intervention (ti = 0 for all
i); we reintroduce the government in Section 5.
The best response of agent i solves ∂Eiui/∂ki = 0, which reduces to
ki = (1 − α)Eiθ + αEiK (1)
where α = r/(1 + r) and K =
R
kjdj. That is, the best response of an agent is a
weighted average of his expectation of θ and his expectation of aggregate activity K.4
The equilibrium is then given by the ﬁxed point to this best-response condition.
3Also note that the payoﬀ structure assumed here is nested in the more general one considered in
Angeletos and Pavan (2006a,b) by rewriting payoﬀs as ui = U(ki,K,σ
2
k,K) = −(1 + r)k
2






2, where K ≡
R






of activity in the population.
4For any random variable z, we let Eiz ≡ Ei[z|xi,y].
4The slope of best responses with respect to aggregate activity K, which here is
a simple increasing function of r, captures how much agents care to align their ac-
tions with one another; it summarizes how the private value to coordination impacts
equilibrium behavior. We accordingly call α the equilibrium degree of coordination.
This coeﬃcient plays a key role on how agents use information in equilibrium.
When α = 0, condition (1) reduces to ki = Eiθ = λµµ+ λyy + λxxi, where (λµ,λy,λx)
are the familiar Bayesian weights.5 That is, when α = 0, the equilibrium action is
simply the best predictor of θ. When instead α > 0, the equilibrium is given by the
linear strategy
ki = γµµ + γyy + γxxi, (2)




> λµ, γy =
λy
1 − αλx




That is, a positive degree of coordination increases the reliance of equilibrium actions to
the prior and to public information, and decreases the reliance to private information.6
The logic for this result is simple. The prior and the public signal are relatively
better predictors of others’ activity than the private signal. The higher α, the more
agents care to align their choices, and hence the more they ﬁnd it optimal to rely on µ
and y. It follows that both γµ and γy increase with α, whereas γx decreases with α.
The equilibrium use of information in turn determines how aggregate activity re-
sponds to both fundamentals and noise. Using γµ +γx + γy = 1 and y = θ + ε, we can
write aggregate activity as K = γµµ + (1 − γµ)θ + γyε, where ε is common noise. It
follows that a higher α, by increasing γµ and γy, reduces the sensitivity of aggregate
activity to the fundamental and increases its sensitivity to common noise. That is, a
higher degree of coordination increases both inertia and volatility. At the same time,
because a higher α reduces the reliance on private information, and hence the sensitiv-
ity to idiosyncratic noise, it also reduces the dispersion of activity in the cross-section
of the population.
5That is, λµ ≡ σ
−2
θ /σ
−2, λy ≡ σ
−2
y /σ











6See the Appendix for the derivation of (2) and (3).
54 Socially optimal degree of coordination
We next turn to the characterization of a particular constrained eﬃcient allocation.
This allocation is the strategy that maximizes ex-ante welfare (i.e., expected utility
behind the veil of ignorance) taking as given the dispersion of information in the popu-
lation. It can be represented as the solution to a planner’s problem, where the planner
can perfectly control how each agent uses his available information, but can not transfer
information from one agent to another.
As it turns out, the eﬃcient allocation is the strategy that satisﬁes
ki = (1 − α∗)Eiθ + α∗EiK, (4)
where α∗ = 2r∗/(1 + 2r∗). Condition (4) is the analog of (1) with α∗ replacing α.
This suggests a simple interpretation of condition (4). The eﬃcient allocation can be
implemented by manipulating the equilibrium degree of coordination perceived by the
agents (for example, through taxes, as we will see in the next section). The coeﬃcient
α∗ then summarizes how much the planner wants the agents to align their actions. We
accordingly identify α∗ with the (socially) optimal degree of coordination.7
Just as α pins down the equilibrium use of information, α∗ pins down the eﬃcient












are as in (3) replacing α with α∗. By implication,
the discrepancy, if any, between the equilibrium and the eﬃcient use of information is
determined merely by the discrepancy, if any, between α and α∗: the sensitivity of the
equilibrium allocation to the prior mean and to public information is ineﬃciently high
if and only if α > α∗. The answer to the ﬁrst question raised in the introduction thus
reduces to a simple comparison between α and α∗.
Result 1. If α > α∗, then the inertia and the volatility featured in equilibrium are
ineﬃciently high; welfare would be higher if agents were to perceive a lower comple-
mentarity in their actions. But if α ≤ α∗, then the heightened levels of inertia and
volatility featured in equilibrium are anything but excessive.
7See the Appendix for the derivation of condition (4).A similar condition characterizes the eﬃcient
use of information in the richer class of economies considered in Angeletos and Pavan (2006a). In
general, the mapping from the underlying payoﬀ structure to the coeﬃcient α
∗ is not a simple as here,
but it remains true that α
∗ summarizes the social value of aligning choices across agents.
65 Optimal policy
When the equilibrium use of information is ineﬃcient (α  = α∗), a novel role for policy
emerges: welfare can be enhanced with policies that manipulate the agents’ incentives
to align their decisions. In our framework, this can be achieved with a relatively
simple linear tax system, which is the incomplete-information analogue of a Pigou tax
system—the key is to make the tax rate contingent on ex-post aggregate activity.
Consider the following tax scheme. Transfers take place at the end of the game,
once agents have made their choices; at that point, the government either observes θ
directly, or it infers it by observing K and y. The transfer made to agent i is then
given by
ti = −τ (K,θ)ki + T (K,θ),
where τ (K,θ) is the marginal tax rate and T (K,θ) a lump-sum transfer. The tax rate
is given by
τ (K,θ) = (2 + 2r)(τKK + τθθ),
for some τK,τθ ∈ R; the coeﬃcients τK and τθ parametrize the sensitivity of the tax
rate to aggregate activity and to the fundamental, while the term 2 + 2r is just a
normalization. Finally, budget balance imposes T (K,θ) = τ (K,θ)K.
Agent i anticipates that the tax rate he will pay per unit of ki will depend on
aggregate activity K. His best response is thus given by
ki = (1 − α − τθ)Eiθ + (α − τK)EiK.
It follows that the proposed policy implements the eﬃcient allocation as an equilibrium
if and only if τK = α−α∗ = −τθ. Hence, the optimal contingency of τ on K is dictated
by the diﬀerence between α and α∗.
Result 2. Any ineﬃciency in the inertia or volatility of the equilibrium allocation
can be corrected by appropriately designing the contingency of the marginal tax rate on
aggregate activity. The optimal tax rate must increase with K if and only if α > α∗.
76 Social value of information
We now show how the relation between α and α∗ helps understand the comparative
statics of equilibrium welfare with respect to information.8
We ﬁnd it useful to decompose any change in the information structure into an
accuracy and a commonality eﬀect. We identify the accuracy of available information
with the reciprocal of the total noise in the agents’ forecasts of the fundamental, and
its commonality with the correlation of noise across agents. That is, letting ωi ≡
θ − Eiθ denote agent i’s forecast error, we deﬁne accuracy as σ−2 = 1/V ar(ωi) and
commonality as δ = Corr(ωi,ωj), for i  = j.9
Welfare is lower under incomplete than under complete information because the
noise in the agents’ information induces “errors” in their actions relative to what they
would have done if they knew θ. These errors manifest themselves in two dimen-
sions. First, common noise (i.e., noise in public information) generates non-fundamental
volatility, that is, variation in aggregate activity K relative to the complete-information
level θ. Second, idiosyncratic noise (i.e., noise in private information) generates cross-
sectional dispersion, that is, variation in individual activity k across agents. Both types
of errors contribute to lower welfare.
An increase in accuracy for given commonality—a reduction in total noise for given
composition of noise—reduces both types of errors and hence necessarily increases
welfare. An increase in commonality for given accuracy, on the other hand, substitutes
one type of error for another: in equilibrium it decreases dispersion but can increase
volatility. Whether this increases welfare depends again on the relation between the
equilibrium and the socially optimal degree of coordination.
Result 3. (i) Equilibrium welfare necessarily increases with the accuracy of infor-
mation. (ii) If α ≤ α∗, welfare also increases with commonality; if instead α > α∗,
welfare is non-monotonic in commonality.
To understand part (ii), note that, when the planner chooses the optimal degree
of coordination, he eﬀectively faces a trade oﬀ between dispersion and volatility: the
higher the degree of coordination perceived by the agents, the lower the sensitivity
8We focus on equilibrium without government. Since the optimal policy restores any eﬃciency in
the equilibrium use of information, the welfare eﬀects of information in an economy with optimal policy
coincide with those in an economy where α = α
∗.

















8to idiosyncratic noise and the higher the sensitivity to common noise, and hence the
lower the dispersion and the higher the volatility. It follows that the optimal degree
of coordination reﬂects social preferences over dispersion and volatility: a higher α∗
means a higher willingness to substitute dispersion for volatility.
When the equilibrium use of information is eﬃcient (α = α∗), higher commonality,
by substituting dispersion for volatility, necessarily raises welfare (provided α∗ > 0, so
that there is a strictly positive value to aligning choices). When, instead, the equi-
librium use of information is ineﬃcient (α  = α∗), the welfare eﬀect of commonality
depends on its eﬀect on this ineﬃciency. Intuitively, an increase in commonality al-
ways facilitates a closer alignment of decisions, but whether this improves eﬃciency
depends on whether there is too little or too much alignment to start with. When
α < α∗, higher commonality mitigates the ineﬃciency and therefore necessarily raises
welfare. When instead α > α∗, higher commonality exacerbates the ineﬃciency and
may thereby reduce welfare.
Having understood the social value of accuracy and commonality, it is now easy to
understand the welfare eﬀects of any change in information. For example, suppose that
a prompt release of news by the media, more transparency in central-bank communi-
cations, or more timely publication of macroeconomic statistics by the administration,
result in an increase in the precision of available public information, keeping constant
the precision of private information. This induces an increase in both the accuracy
and the commonality of information. By Result 3, the increase in accuracy necessarily
boosts welfare; but the increase in commonality can decrease welfare if the equilib-
rium degree of coordination is ineﬃciently high. The following is then an immediate
implication.
Result 3b. More precise public information necessarily increases welfare if α ≤ α∗,
but can decrease welfare if α is suﬃciently higher than α∗.
As another example of how the relation between α and α∗ aﬀects the social value
of information, suppose that a policy maker faces the choice between two possible ways
of communicating to the market: very ﬁne messages that convey a lot of information
but—precisely because they are too ﬁne—are likely to be interpreted in idiosyncratic
ways; and simpler messages that convey less information but—precisely because they
are simpler—admit a common interpretation. Then, the policy maker eﬀectively faces a
trade-oﬀ between accuracy and commonality; if α∗ ≥ α, so that commonality is socially
9desirable, he may well opt for the coarser messages. (See Morris and Shin (2006) for a
motivation and further implications.)
7 Conclusion
We argued that the relation between the private and the social value to coordination is
the key to answering all the normative questions raised in the introduction—whether
the inertia and volatility featured in equilibrium are ineﬃcient, what is the role of policy
in correcting how agents use information, and what is the social value of information.
We illustrated this point within the context of a speciﬁc example, which admitted
a simple parametrization of the private and social values of coordination. In general,
the mapping from the payoﬀ structure to the equilibrium and optimal degrees of co-
ordination need not be as simple as in the example considered here. Yet, the main
insight extends: the private value of aligning choices can be read from the slope of
best responses, while the social value of such alignment can be read from the slope of
best responses that would make agents internalize all externalities. (See Angeletos and
Pavan, 2006a.)
For example, in the beauty-contest models of Morris and Shin (2002) and Angele-
tos, Lorenzoni and Pavan (2006), the complementarity perceived by the agents is not
warranted from a social perspective (α > 0 but α∗ = 0). This explains why in these
models welfare may decrease with higher commonality, and hence may also decrease
with more precise public information. In contrast, in the business-cycle models of Hell-
wig (2005) and Roca (2005), the social value of coordination turns out to be higher than
the private one (α∗ > α). This is because individual utility falls with cross-sectional
dispersion in prices—an externality that raises the social value of aligning prices across
ﬁrms. As a result, the heightened inertia and volatility featured in these models due
to the complementarity in pricing decisions are anything but excessive; and welfare
necessarily increases with more precise public information.
10Appendix
Proof of Conditions (2)-(3). Suppose that all agents follow a linear strategy as in
(2), for some coeﬃcients (γµ,γy,γx). Given this strategy, aggregate activity is given by
K = γµµ + γyy + γxθ and the best-response condition (1) for agent i reduces to
ki = (1 − α)Ei [θ] + αEi [γµµ + γyy + γxθ]
= (1 − α + αγx)Ei [θ] + αγµµ + αγµy
= [(1 − α + αγx)λµ + αγµ]µ + [(1 − α + αγx)λy + αγy]y + [(1 − α + αγx)λx]xi.
For the proposed strategy to be an equilibrium, it must be that
γµ = (1 − α + αγx)λµ + αγµ,
γy = (1 − α + αγx)λy + αγy,
γx = (1 − α + αγx)λx.
Solving the above for (γµ,γy,γx) gives (3). (For a discussion of when this linear strategy
is the unique equilibrium, see Angeletos and Pavan, 2006a.)
Proof of Condition (4). Consider an arbitrary strategy k : R2 → R. Ex-ante













where F (x|θ,y) is the c.d.f. of the conditional distribution of x given (θ,y), G(θ,y)
is the c.d.f. of the joint distribution of (θ,y), Li =
R
xj (ki − kj)
2 dF (xj|θ,y), ki =


















2 dF (x|θ,y) − 2K (θ,y)
2
where K (θ,y) =
R
x k(x,y)dF (x|θ,y). Hence, we can think of the planner as choosing







−(k (x,y) − θ)
2 − 2r∗k (x,y)
2
i





11subject to the constraint K (θ,y) =
R
x k (x,y)dF (x|θ,y). Setting up the Lagrangian
for this problem, taking the ﬁrst-order conditions for k (x,y) and K (θ,y), combining
the two (so as to get rid of the lagrange multiplier), and using the law of iterated
expectations, we get that the following must hold for almost all (x,y) :
Z
θ
{−2[k(x,y) − θ] − 4r∗k(x,y) + 4r∗K (θ,y)}dP (θ|x,y) = 0,
where P (θ|x,y) is the c.d.f. of the conditional distribution of θ given x and y. Using
α∗ = 2r∗/(1+2r∗) and rearranging, the above reduces to (4). Because the maximization
problem is concave, this condition is both necessary and suﬃcient. (For a more detailed
derivation, see Angeletos and Pavan, 2006a.)
Proof of Result 3. Using (5), it is easy to see that, for any given strategy
k : R2 → R, ex-ante welfare is given by















= −(1 + 2r∗)E(k − K)
2 − E(K − θ)
2 ,
where E[ ] denotes the expectation over (θ,y,x). Using the fact that, at the equilibrium
strategy, E[k] = E[K] = E[θ], the above reduces to
Ew = −c{V ar(k − K) + (1 − α∗)V ar(K − θ)}.
where c = 1 + 2r∗ > 0. Moreover, by (2)-(3), we have
V ar(k − K) =
(1 − α)2(1 − δ)
(1 − α + αδ)2 σ2 and V ar(K − θ) =
δ




(1 − α∗)δ + (1 − α)2(1 − δ)
(1 − α + αδ)2 σ2
￿
,
from which the result follows.
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